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Abstract
We build on ideas from convex optimization to create a general framework for the
design of efﬁcient prediction markets over very large outcome spaces.
1 Introduction
A prediction market is a ﬁnancial market primarily focused on the aggregation of information. To
facilitate trades, prediction markets are often operated by automated market institutions. The market
institution, referred to as a market maker, trades a set of securities. In the most simple case, each
security corresponds to the outcome of an event. The market maker might offer a security that pays
off $1 if and only if BP ﬁles for bankruptcy by the end of the year. A risk neutral trader who believes
that the probability of BP ﬁling for bankruptcy is p should be willing to purchase this security at any
price below p, or sell it at any price above p. Based on this intuition, the current market price can be
viewed as the traders’ collective estimate of how likely it is that BP will ﬁle for bankruptcy. Market-
based probability estimates have proved to be accurate in a variety of domains including business,
entertainment, and politics [2, 13, 17].
Prediction market research has largely focused on cost function based markets over complete se-
curity spaces [5, 6]. Consider a future event with n mutually exclusive and exhaustive potential
outcomes, such as a contest with n possible winners. In a complete cost function based market, a
market maker buys and sells securities corresponding to each outcome i ∈ {1,    ,n}. The security
associated with outcome i pays out $1 if i is the ﬁnal outcome, and $0 otherwise. The market maker
determines how much each security should cost using a differentiable cost function. A cost function
C : Rn → R is simply a potential function specifying the amount of money currently wagered in
the market as a function of the number of outstanding securities. If qi is the number of securities
on outcome i currently held by traders, and a trader would like to purchase a bundle of ri securities
for each i (where some ri could be zero or even negative, representing a sale), the trader must pay
C(q + r) − C(q) to the market maker. The instantaneous price of security i (that is, the price per
security of an inﬁnitely small portion of a security) is then ∂C(q)/∂qi, and is denoted pi(q).
The market designer is free to choose any differentiable cost function C that satisﬁes a few basic
properties. First, it must be the case that for every i ∈ {1,    ,n} and every q ∈ Rn, pi(q) ≥ 0.
This ensures that the price of a security is never negative. Second, it must be the case that for every
q ∈ Rn,
Pn
i=1 pi(q) = 1. If the instantaneous prices summed to something less than (respectively,
greater than) 1, then a trader could purchase (respectively, sell) small equal quantities of each secu-
rity for a guaranteed proﬁt. These conditions ensure that there are no arbitrage opportunities within
the market. They also ensure that the current prices can be viewed as a probability distribution over
the outcome space, representing the market’s prediction based on the traders’ collective beliefs.
When the number of outcomes is very large, it might not be feasible to run a complete predic-
tion market over the full outcome space. There has been a surge of recent research examining the
∗For more details, see our longer draft available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.1941.
1tractability of running standard prediction market mechanisms (such as the popular Logarithmic
Market Scoring Rule [10]) over combinatorial outcome spaces by limiting the space of available
securities [7–9, 15]. For example, if the outcome space contains all possible n! rank orderings of
n horses in a race, a market maker might choose to sell only pairwise securities of the form “horse
A will ﬁnish the race ahead of horse B.” If the outcome space is a large Boolean space, the mar-
ket maker might sell securities on disjunctions of two events (“either a Democrat will win the 2012
senate race in Delaware or a Democrat will win in Ohio”). In these examples, running a naive imple-
mentation of the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule over the full outcome space would be infeasible.
While this line of research has led to a few positive results (most notably, the tractability of pricing
certain types of securities for large, single-elimination tournaments [8]), it has led more often to
hardness results [7] or to markets with undesirable properties such as unbounded worst case market
maker loss [9]. Building on recent work exploring mathematical connections between prediction
market mechanisms and algorithms for online learning [6], we take a different approach to mar-
ket design. Instead of beginning with an existing market mechanism and searching for a security
space for which it is tractable to calculate prices, we incorporate ideas from online convex optimiza-
tion [11, 16] to design new cost function based markets tailored to any security space we have in
mind. This approach is more general and applies to a wide variety of settings.
2 A New Framework for Market-Making Over Complex Security Spaces
In the complete cost function based markets described above, the market maker offers a security
corresponding to each potential state of the world. We consider a market-design scenario where the
state space O could potentially be quite large, or even inﬁnite, making it infeasible to run such a mar-
ket. Instead, we allow the market maker to offer a menu of K securities for some reasonably-sized
K, with the payoff of each security described by an arbitrary but efﬁciently-computable function
ρ : O → RK
+. Speciﬁcally, if a trader purchases a share of security i and the outcome is o, then
the trader is paid ρi(o). We call such security spaces complex. A complex security space reduces
to the complete security space if K = |O| and for each i ∈ {1,    ,K}, ρi(o) = 1 if and only if
o is the ith outcome. We consider traders that purchase security bundles r ∈ RK. The payoff for r
upon outcome o is exactly ρ(o)   r, where ρ(o) denotes the vector of payoffs for each security for
outcome o. Let ρ(O) = {ρ(o)|o ∈ O}.
We do not presuppose a cost function based market. However, we show that the use of a convex
potential function is necessary given some minor assumptions.
2.1 Imposing Some Natural Restrictions on the Market Maker
In this section we introduce a sequence of conditions or axioms that one might expect a market to
satisfy, and show that these conditions lead to some natural mathematical restrictions on the costs
of security bundles. (We consider relaxations of these conditions in the long version.) Similar
conditions were suggested for complete markets by Chen and Vaughan [6], who deﬁned the notion
of a valid cost function, and by Othman et al. [14], who discussed properties similar to our notions
of path independence and expressiveness, among others.
Imagine a sequence of traders entering the marketplace and purchasing security bundles. Let
r1,r2,r3,... be the sequence of security bundles purchased. After t − 1 such purchases, the tth
trader should be able to enter the marketplace and query the market maker for the cost of arbitrary
bundles. The market maker must be able to furnish a cost Cost(r|r1,...,rt−1) for any bundle r. If
the trader chooses to purchase rt at a cost of Cost(rt|r1,...,rt−1), the market maker may update
the costs of each bundle accordingly. Our ﬁrst condition requires that the cost of acquiring a bundle
r must be the same regardless of how the trader splits up the purchase.
Condition 1 (Path Independence). For any r, r′, and r′′ such that r = r′ + r′′, for any r1,...,rt,
Cost(r|r1,...,rt) = Cost(r′|r1,...,rt) + Cost(r′′|r1,...,rt,r′).
It turns out that this condition alone implies that prices can be represented by a cost function C, as
illustrated in the following theorem. The proof is by induction on t.
Theorem 1. Under Condition 1, there exists a cost function C : RK → R such that we may always
write Cost(rt|r1,...,rt−1) = C(r1 + ... + rt−1 + rt) − C(r1 + ... + rt−1).
2With this in mind, we drop the cumbersome Cost(r|r1,...,rt) notation from now on, and write the
cost of a bundle r as C(q+r)−C(q), where q = r1 +...+rt is the vector of previous purchases.
We would like to aggregate traders’ beliefs into an accurate prediction. Each trader may have his
own (potentially secret) information about the future, which we can represent as some distribution
p ∈ ∆|O| over the outcome space. The pricing mechanism should therefore incentivize the traders
to reveal p, while simultaneously avoid providing arbitrage opportunities. Towards this goal, we
introduce four additional conditions on our pricing mechanism.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that the gradient of C is always well-deﬁned. If we imagine that a
trader can buy or sell an arbitrarily small bundle, we would like the cost of buying and selling
an inﬁnitesimally small quantity of any bundle to be the same. If ∇C(q) is well-deﬁned, it can
be interpreted as a vector of instantaneous prices for each security, with ∂C(q)/∂qi representing
the price per share of an inﬁnitesimally small amount of security i. Additionally, we can interpret
∇C(q) as the traders’ current estimates of the expected payoff of each security, in the same way that
∂C(q)/∂qi was interpreted as the probability of the ith outcome for the complete security space.
Condition 2 (Existence of Instantaneous Prices). C is continuous and differentiable everywhere.
The next condition encompasses the idea that the market should react to trades in a sensible way in
order to incorporate the private information of the traders. In particular, it says that the purchase of a
security bundle r should never cause the market to lower the price of r. It is equivalent to requiring
that a trader with a distribution p ∈ ∆|O| can never ﬁnd it simultaneously proﬁtable (in expectation)
to buy a bundle r or to buy the bundle −r.
Condition 3 (Information Incorporation). For any q and r ∈ RK, C(q + 2r) − C(q + r) ≥
C(q + r) − C(q).
The no arbitrage condition states that it is never possible for a trader to purchase a security bundle r
and receive a positive proﬁt regardless of the outcome.
Condition 4 (No Arbitrage). For all q,r ∈ RK, ∃o ∈ O such that C(q + r) − C(q) ≥ r   ρ(o).
Finally, expressiveness speciﬁes that a trader can set the market prices to reﬂect his beliefs about the
expected payoffs of each security if arbitrarily small portions of shares may be purchased.
Condition 5 (Expressiveness). For any p ∈ ∆|O|, ∃q ∈ RK ∪ {∞,−∞} for which ∇C(q) =
Eo∼p[ρ(o)].
Let H(S) denote the convex hull of a set S ⊂ RK. We characterize the form of the cost function
under these conditions.
Theorem 2. Under Conditions 2-5, C must be convex with {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} = H(ρ(O)).
Speciﬁcally, the existence of instantaneous prices implies that ∇C(q) is well-deﬁned. The incorpo-
ration of information condition implies that C is convex. The convexity of C and the no arbitrage
condition imply that {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} ⊆ H(ρ(O)). Finally, the expressiveness condition is
equivalent to requiring that H(ρ(O)) ⊆ {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK}.
This theorem tells us that to satisfy our conditions, the set of reachable prices of a market should be
exactly the convex hull of ρ(O). For complete markets, this would imply that the set of reachable
prices should be precisely the set of all probability distributions over the n outcomes.
2.2 Designing the Cost Function via Conjugate Duality
The natural conditions we introduced above imply that to design a market for a set of K securities
with payoffs speciﬁed by an arbitrary payoff function ρ : O → RK
+, we should use a cost function
based market with a convex, differentiable cost function such that {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} = H(ρ(O)).
We now provide a general technique that can be used to design and compare properties of cost
functions that satisfy these criteria, using tools from convex analysis.
It is well known that any closed, convex, differentiable function C : RK → R can be written in
the form C(q) = supx∈dom(R) x   q − R(x) for a strictly convex function R called the conjugate
of C [3, 12]. (The strict convexity of R follows from the differentiability of C.) Furthermore, any
3function that can be written in this form is convex. As we describe in the full version of this work, the
gradient of C can be expressed in terms of this conjugate: ∇C(q) = argmaxx∈dom(R) x q−R(x).
To generate a convex cost function C such that ∇C(q) ∈ Π for all q for some set Π, it is therefore
sufﬁcient to choose a conjugate function R, restrict the domain of R to Π, and deﬁne C as
C(q) = sup
x∈Π
x   q − R(x) . (1)
Wecallsuchamarketacomplex costfunction basedmarket. To generate acostfunctionC satisfying
our ﬁve conditions, we need only to set Π = H(ρ(O)) and select a strictly convex function R.
This method of deﬁning C is convenient for several reasons. First, it leads to markets that are
efﬁcient to implement whenever Π can be described by a polynomial number of simple constraints.
Similartechniqueshavebeenappliedtodesignlearningalgorithmsintheonlineconvexoptimization
framework [11, 16], where R plays the role of a regularizer, and have been shown to be efﬁcient in
a variety of combinatorial applications, including online shortest paths, online learning of perfect
matchings, and online cut set [4]. Second, it yields simple formulas for properties of markets that
help us choose the best market to run, such as worst-case monetary loss and information loss.
NotethatboththeLMSRandQuad-SCPM[1]areexamplesofcomplexcostfunctionbasedmarkets,
though they are designed for the complete market setting only.
2.3 An Example
To illustrate the use of our framework for market design, we consider the following example. An
object orbiting the planet, perhaps a satellite, is predicted to fall to earth in the near future and will
land at an unknown location, which we would like to predict. We represent locations on the earth
as unit vectors u ∈ R3. We will design a market with three securities, each corresponding to one
coordinate of the ﬁnal location of the object. In particular, security i will pay off ui + 1 dollars
if the object lands in location u. (The addition of 1, while not strictly necessary, ensures that the
payoffs, and therefore prices, remain positive, though it will be necessary for traders to sell securities
to express certain beliefs.) This means that traders can purchase security bundles r ∈ R3 and, when
the object lands at a location u, receive a payoff (u + 1)   r. Note that in this example, the outcome
space is inﬁnite, but the security space is small.
The price space H(ρ(O)) for this market will be the ℓ2-norm unit ball centered at 1. We shall use
      to refer to the ℓ2-norm. To construct a market for this scenario, let us make the simple choice
of R(x) = λ x − 1 2 for some parameter λ > 0. When  q  ≤ 2λ, there exists an x such that
∇R(x) = q. In particular, this is true for x = (1/2)q/λ + 1, and q   x − R(x) is minimized
at this point. When  q  > 2λ, q   x − R(x) is minimized at an x on the boundary of H(ρ(O)).
Speciﬁcally, it is minimized at x = q/||q|| + 1. From this, we can compute
C(q) =
￿ 1
4λ q 2 + q   1, when  q  ≤ 2λ,
 q  + q   1 − λ, when  q  > 2λ.
We can show that the worst-case monetary loss of the market maker is no more than 2λ, and the
information loss, deﬁned as the bid-ask spread of a bundle r, scales linearly with  r 2/λ; see the
longer version for details.
By relaxing our “no-arbitrage” condition, we can also use this framework to design a new efﬁcient
market maker for pair betting (“horse A ahead of horse B”), which is known to be #P-hard to price
using LMSR [7]. Surprisingly, this relaxation does not increase the market maker’s worst-case loss,
and can actually lead to a proﬁt.
3 Conclusion
Leveraging techniques from convex optimization, we propose a general framework to design mar-
ket maker mechanisms on arbitrary security spaces. While past research on combinatorial prediction
markets has focused on ﬁnding security spaces that are tractable to price using popular market mech-
anisms, ourframeworkopensupthepossibilityofdesigningnewefﬁcientmarketmakermechanisms
for security spaces of interest, such as pair betting markets. We believe that this framework will lead
to fruitful new directions of research in prediction market design and implementation.
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